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In his Riverside Lectures delivered in 1956 Professor Harry 
W. Jones identified the reasons for what he calls the "Natural 
Law-Iegal realism antagonism". To begin with, much of the 
Natural Law criticism of the realists was merely a returning of 
blow for blow. Early realist writings, particularly, contain a good 
deal of hit-and-run cynicism directed not only at the method but 
at the aspirations of Natural Law thinking. Second, and more 
important, the realists were answering different questions, 
attempting a long-needed analysis of the decisional process, 
without always making it clear that this was what they were 
about. There was underbrush to be cleared away -particularly the 
old slot-machine theory of judicial decision- and realist 
commitment to this limited mission was such as to create a 
widespread impression that the realists, as a group, were not at all 
interested in the problem of justice. This concentration on the 
decisional process as it is in fact, and consequent underplaying of 
the legal ought-to-be, was bound to draw fire from the members 
of a philosophical tradition that had focused its attention for 
seven hundred years on justice and righteousness in law. Third, 
and I think this is the fundamental source of antagonism, one 
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basic realist attack was on what Holmes called "the fallacy of 
logical form" in law, the adequacy of the syllogism as an expla-
nation of the process of judicial decision. "The historie asso-
ciation of Scholastic thought, including Scholastic Natural law, 
with the method of formal logic is such that sharp dissent from 
the Naturallaw quarter was inevitable" (from The Nature 01 Law, 
Readings in Legal Philosophy, edited by M.P. Golding, Columbia 
University, Random House, New York, page 264). 
Professor Jones observes that legal realism "is not a systematic 
philosophy of law to which all the so-called realists subscribe, but 
rather a way of looking at legal rules and legal processes". Then 
Jones points out that "the common feature that justifies bringing 
them all under one tent is a shared skeptical temper towards legal 
generalizations ... and that "Mr. Holmes is, of course, the hero 
figure of the clan" (262). Thus, let us examine Holmes' con-
ception of law. 
The legal revolution started in an address delivered by Mr. 
Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, at 
the dedication of the new hall of the Boston University School of 
Law, on January 8, 1897. (Harvard Law Review, vol. X, 457). 
Holmes elaborated upon two pitfalls of the law: one of con-
founding law and morality and the other the fallacy that the only 
force at work in the development of the law is logic. In relation to 
the first pitfall, Holmes warned us "when I emphasize the 
difference between law and morals I do so with reference to a 
single end, that of learning and understanding the law".Then he 
formulates his famous "Bad man" theory: "if you want to know 
the law and nothing else, you must look at it as abad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which su eh knowledge 
enables him to predict". Thus, the bad man he does not care two 
straws for morality but he only wants to know (and that's why he 
hires a lawyer) what the courts are likely to do in fact, because 
"the prophecies of what the course will do in fact, and nothing 
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law". For this reason he 
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told bluntly those young students: "when we study law we are not 
studying a mystery but a well-known profession". The job of the 
lawyer is that of prediction, "prediction of the incidence of the 
public force through the instruments of the court". Holmes was 
very conscious of the possible reactions of his audience, not only 
of that hall, but of the world in general, thus he warns: "1 take it 
for granted that no hearer of mine will misinterpret what I have to 
sayas the language of cynicism". From then on, he was known as 
"the great cynic", and he referred in his speech to this attitude of 
separating law and morality as to wash something "with cynical 
acid". In order to disentangle the confusion between law and 
morality he refers to an example and to the law of contract. 
"Three hundred years ago a parson preached a sermon and told a 
story out of Fox's Book of Martyrs of aman who had assisted at 
the torture of one of the saints, and afterward died, suffering 
compensatory inward torment. It happened that Fox was wrong. 
The man was alive and chanced to hear the sermon, and 
thereupon he sued the parson. Chief Justice Wray instructed the 
jury that the defendant was not liable, because the story was told 
innocently without malice. He took malice in the moral sense, 
as importing a malevolent motive. But nowadays no one doubts 
that aman may be fiable, without any malevolent motive at all, 
for false statements manifestly calculated to inflict temporal 
damage". Thus Holmes clarifies: "we still should call the 
defendant's conduct malicious; but in my opinion at least, the 
word means nothing about motives. In the law of contract the use 
of moral phraseology has led to equal confusion ... morals deal 
with the actual internal state of the individuals mind, what he 
actually intends ... we talk about a contract as a meeting of the 
minds ... yet nothing is more certain than the parties may be bound 
by a contract to things which neither of them intended ... because 
"contracts are formal" and "the making of a contract depends not 
on the agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the 
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agreement of two sets of external signs -not on the parties' having 
meant the same thing but on their having said the same thing" . 
Next Holmes elaborates on the second pitfall of the law: "that 
the only force at work in the development of the law is logic" . (In 
his book The Common Law he had already advanced this position 
that put him at the forefront of legal realism). Holmes refers to 
the danger of trying to work out law like mathematics. This is a 
"natural" mode of thinking "longing for certainty" . However, he 
tells us "behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative 
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an 
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very 
root and nerve of the whole proceeding". Holmes is talking of "a 
matter not capable for exact quantitative measurement". He gives 
us a concrete example to illustrate the case: "why is aman at 
liberty to set up a business which he knows will ruin his 
neighbor? It is because the public good is supposed to be best 
subserved by free competition" . (Holmes in trying to get at "the 
root and nerve of the whole proceeding" makes an analysis of the 
underlying causes of liability in accidents. He feels that judges 
are responsible for not exposing "the very ground and foundation 
of judgments". Thus it seems that Holmes is very much aware of 
the existence of sorne principIes that are the nerve of the whole 
proceeding). It is in this respect that 1 would like to mention sorne 
cornments of M.R. Cohen: 
"The present wave of nominalism in juristic science is a 
reaction by younger men against the abuse of abstract principIes 
by an older generation that neglected the adequate factual 
analysis necessary to make principIes properly applicable. It is 
natural, therefore, for the rebels to claim as their own one who for 
more than the time of one generation has valiantly stood for the 
need of more factual knowledge in the law. But no group can 
claim Justice Holmes as its own unless it shares his respect for 
the complexity of the legal situation and exercises the same 
caution against hastily jumping from one extreme error to the 
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opposite. Holmes' position is, 1 judge, in perfect agreement with 
that of a logical pragmatist like Pierce: Legal principIes have no 
meaning apart from the judicial decisions in concrete cases that 
can be deduced from them, and principIes alone (i.e., without 
knowledge or assumption as to the facts) cannot logically decide 
cases. But Holmes has always insisted that the man of science in 
the law must no only possess an eye for detail but also "insight 
which tells him what details are significant". And significance 
involves general principies that determine which facts are 
irrelevant and which may be neglected as irrelevant. The law 
consists of prophecies as to how the public force (as directed by 
courts) will act. But the judge whom Holmes respects is the one 
who, like Shaw, not only has technical knowledge, but also 
understands "the ground of public policy to which all laws must 
ultimately be referred". (Law and the Social Order, New York, 
Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1933, pp. 212 and 13). 
For an elaborate appraisal of the shifting image of Holmes in 
the American scholarly community 1 strongly recommend G. 
Edward White's essay: "The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes", 
The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 39, n° 1 (1971). 
By taking the position of the lawyer as a professional predictor 
of the court's decisions, Holmes imposed a tunnel vision on the . 
law that demanded expansion later on by legal realists like 
Llewellyn. Kantorowicz used the image of baseball. It would be 
silly to think that the rules of this game are simply generalized 
predictions of what umpires will decide! And one can always 
wonder about the nature of the law for the judge: is law for him 
predictions of what he will decide? 
* * * 
If Holmes started the reaction against logical formalism, it was 
Hermann Kantorowicz who brought it to a screeching halt with 
the best organized essay ever written on legal realismo The essay 
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is entitled "Sorne Rationalism about Realism", Yale Law Joumal, 
vol. 43, (1934), pp. 1240-52. Copyright, 1934 by the Yale Law 
Joumal Co. 
Kantorowicz reduces legal realism to two fundamental 
postulates: that law (as the judge's decision) is not a body of rules 
but of facts, and that legal science is an empirical science. He 
traces the first postulate to the "free law" doctrine (the judges fill 
the gaps of laws with rules). The second derives from the 
sociological school of law. 
The nature of law of the realists betrays six fundamental 
prejudices: that the law consists of nothing but formal principIes 
(formalistic prejudice); the attack on words (verbalistic preju-
dice); refusal to investigate the meaning of the legislator (his-
torical prejudice); overlooking the fact that language is related to 
classes (nominalistic prejudice); exclusive consideration of living 
institutions, not laws (sociological prejudice); exclusive concen-
tration on prediction of court's decisions (professional prejudice). 
Kantorowicz considers the startling consequences of the 
postulate that says that there is no law outside of the decisions; 
undecided cases are outside of the realm of law; brand new 
statutes couldn't be interpreted (since there is no science of law to 
interpret them, since law is just decisions); contradictory deci-
sions could not be predicted; what about rules that never carne 
before the court ("the president must be 35 years of age"); the law 
that reads "murder is punishable by death" is not a law until it 
happens; why do we have learned men to decide cases? 
Kantorowicz next investigates the nature of legal science 
(empirical) and observes that this theory is based on six 
confusions: 1) confusion of natural and cultural science, the cop 
stops you because you went through a red light (observable fact) 
and then he tells you that you "ought have stopped (not 
observable); 2) confusion of "explanation" and "justification". 
The judge comes to court intoxicated (explanation) but his 
decisions cannot be justified by law: 3) confusion of law and 
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morality: Notice how the legal realists incriminate themselves by 
this accusation to the defenders of classical morality: because, 
who could "confuse" things unless he accepts that there are two 
things to be confused? But since the realists only accept "facts" 
then really, they are the ones who blend two realities in fact when 
they observe a distinction; 4) confusion of reality and meaning. 
Realists insist on the "tangible" of the empirical facts. A new 
born baby has become the richest man when his rich daddy dies. 
But nothing üf this change is "observable" in the child. 5) Placing 
the cart before the horse: poetry is what poets write; shoes are 
what shoemakers make. Law is what courts will decide!; 6) 
Confusion of cases and "case law". But cases themselves are not 
binding but the reasons for their decisions, and if repeated, they 
have the binding force of precedent. 
Kantorowicz considers now the startling consequences pro-
duced by the conception of law as an empirical science. Dis-
senting opinions would always be contrary to legal science 
(which is only of observable decisions). Charging a jury would 
imply the judge telling what he is about to do. The proper study 
of law schools would be to study the psychology of the judges so 
as to be able to predict their decisions! 
The main emphasis of Kantorowicz' article is that the realists 
were more concerned with what the courts were doing that with 
what could be deduced from the norms of the laws. He stressed 
that the "law is not what the courts administer, but the courts are 
the institutions which administer the law" (page 250). 
Kantorowicz was greatly attracted to the ideas of Savigny, the 
founder of the historical school and was one of the first German 
professors of law to espouse sociology as a complement to 
jurisprudence. Savigny himself with his historical school was 
reacting against the rationalism of the Iusnaturalist school of the 
seventeenth century. In more modern times the founders of the 
sociology of law were reacting against the abstract formalism of 
the norms. Thus Eugene Ehrlich in his Fundamental Principies of 
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Sociology of Law stressed that "the center of gravity of legal 
development Hes not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in 
juridical decision, but in society itself". Harvard University Press, 
1936. 
Along with Kantorowicz, one ofthe most eminent pioneers of 
modern sociological jurisprudence was Roscoe Pound. They both 
were concerned with the main objective of sociological juris-
prudence as that of framing hypotheses on which to base the 
operation of general laws governing laws in society. For that 
purpose sociological jurisprudence has to avail itself of the proper 
methodology of the social sciences (like statistical, analysis, 
surveys, etc.). It seems that must of what sociological juris-
prudence does is to bring to law what the social sciences 
discover. In doing this they are faced with a difficult problem 
w~ich is that of the integration of what is considered a factual 
science (sociology) with another concerned with values 
Qurisprudence) . 
Pound's famous program of 1911-12 in which he formulated 
the practical objectives for his movement, was criticized on the 
grounds that it was like an orchestra for ever tuning up the 
instruments without actually playing or like athletes constantly 
flexing their musc1es but never getting into the arena, while other 
critics complained about the tendency to "activism" displayed by 
the school. 
